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THE STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT: COUNTY OF ALBANY
In the Matter of the Application of

MATTHEW HALL, #95-A-4333,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,

Index #5330-03
RJI #Ol-03-ST3893
Decision, Order and
Judgment

Respondent.
For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules.
l
a

.(Suprei;ne Court, Albany County, Special Term, November 2 1, 2003)
(Justice Edward A. Sheridan, Presiding)
APPEARANCES:
MATIHEW HALL, Pro se
Otisville C01Tectional Facility
P.O. Box 8
....
Otisville, New York 10963
HON. ELIOT SPITZER
Attorney General of the State of New York
(Megan M. Brown, of Counsel)
Attorney for Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
SHERIDAN, J.:

Petitioner, currently an inmate at Otisville Correctional Facility, brings this special
proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, seeldng review of respondent's denial of his
application for parole following his re~appearance before the Board on June 19, 2002.
Following petitioner's initial appearance before the Board, parole was denied and
petitioner was ordered held for twet?-ty four months. At the time ofhis re-appearance, petitioner had
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served 94 months of a sentence of six to .eighteen years imposed upon his conviction, by plea, for
manslaughter in the first degree. At the hearing, petitioner's prior criminal history was briefly noted.
There was extensive discussion of the instant crime and the circumstances surrounding it.
Petitioner's institutional programming was noted, and the Board noted that petitioner had "taken all
the violence programs you can talce". Petitioner stated that he had obtained a GED and an EEC, and
~

I

his good institutional record (one Tier II ticket incurred shortly after his initial appearance) was
noted. Co:m,menting

011

petitioner's EEC, the commissioner noted "that doesn't guarantee your

\

. releasp. You understand that? ... That's only o~e piece of it. DOCS knows one piece of it. They
don't base that on your entire criminal record. They don't base that on the instant offense. You can
have the most horrific crime, but if you have a sentence that's no more than six years you're still
eligible for the Earned Eligibility Certificate." Petitioner's residential and employment plans upon
release were reviewed, and there was further discussion of the facts underlying the instant offense.
The Board denied petitioner parole release, stating:
Despite an earned eligibility certificate, parole is denied for the
following reasons: after a:~eful revie:w ofyour entj.re record and this .
interview, it is the determination ofthis panel that if released at this
time there is a reasonable· probability thfrt you ,would not live and
remain at liberty without .violating the law and your release at this
time is incompatible with the welfare .and safety of the community.
This decision is based on the following factors: serio.us nature of the
offense. You are currently · Servi~g ~anslaughter 1st, where you
became involved in an altercation on the street at approximately 4:00
A.M. where you stabbed your victim causing his death. You
demonstrated utter disregard for human life and .safety. Your ciiminal
record consists oflarcenous offenses with the inst~~ offense a serious
escalation of your criminal behavior. The panel recognizes your
prograi:nparticipatio11 and your institu1i.o.nal be,b.avior. However, your
violent response to this confrontation in the community: deems you a
poor candidate for discre.tionary relea~e.
·

2
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Petitioner was ordered held for 24 months. The decision to deny parole was affirmed upon
petitioner's administrative appeal~ and he commenced this judicial proceeding.
Petitioner contends that respondent's determination that he would not remain free
without violating the law is unsupported by the record and is based solely on the serious nature of
the instant offense and his criminal history. He argues that the reasons set forth for denial are
?.

insufficient as a matter oflaw inasmuch as his possession of an Earned Eligibility Certificate at the
time of his second appearance before the Board required the panei to focus on factors subsequent to
I

his cpmmission of the instant cri~e (see ~orrection Law §805; 9 NYCRR §8002.3[b]; (c]).
Petitioner asserts that the written decision does not comply with Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) because
!

it is vague an~ conclusory, irrational, and fails to provide petitioner with guidance regarding what
rehabilitative steps he may take to earn parole. He further contends that respondent's decision is
.

.

defective because the panel allowed personal, political and public opinion to enter the deCision.

.

.

making calculus. H~ also contends that one of the Comrp.issioners on the panel was biased against
him and biased the other Commissioners with discus~ion of petitioner's appeal from the denial of
parole after his initial appearance. Respondent asserts that petitioner's claims regarding "political
influence" and the Commissioner's bias are not properly before the Court, and contends that the
denial of parole and the 24 month hold was based on a hearing and review of petifton' s file that was
conducted in accordance with all statutory, constitutional and regulatory requirements, and that the
determination must therefore be affirmed.
Within the general statutory guideposts set forth in Executive Law §259-i(l) and (2),
the Parole Board has wide discretion in deciding whether or not to grant parole release. "So long
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as the Board violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyond review
in the Courts" (Matter of Briguglio v Board of Parole, 24 NY2d 21, 29, quoting Matter of Hines v
State Board of Parole, 293 NY 254, 257). The discretionary determination of the Parole Board, if
made in accordance with the statutes, will not be disturbed absent a showing oferror or irrationality
bordering on impropriety (see Matter ofSilmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 4 70; Matter of Saunders v Travis,
238 AD2d 688, lv denied 90 NY2d 805, citing Matter of Russo v N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d
69, 77; Matier of Ristau v Hammock, I 03 AD2d 944, lv denied 63 NY2d 608).
l

i

Pursuant to the statutes and regulations that govern the Parole Board's determinations,

a candidate's criminality is a valid factor for the Board to consider (Executive Law §§259-i[l ][a],
.

.

[2][c]; 9 NYCRR § 8001 .3). As respondent contends, petitioner's possession ofan Earned Eligibility
Certificate does not preclude the Board from considering his instant and prior offenses (see Matter
of Cornejo v.New York State Division of Parole 269 AD2d 713; Matter of Herouard v Travis, 250
AD2d 911; Matter of Jackson v New York. State Division of Parole, 217 AD2d 732; Matter of
Salcedo v Ross, 183 AD2d 771). However, it was erroneous for the Board to deny parole based
solely upon the "serious nature of the offense", for two different reasons.

.

.

.

....·

First, to deny parole exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner's crime, even in the
absence of an EEC, there must have been "some significantly aggravating or egregious
circumstances surrounding commission of the particular crime" (Matter of King v New York State
Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 433, affd 83 NY2d 788). Neither the record submitted to the Court
in this case nor the Board's written decisi9n reveal a factual basis indicating the presence of
"significantly aggravating or egregious circumstances" surrounding petitioner's commission of the

4
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instant crime (compare Matter ofRentz v Herbert, 206 AD2d 944, lv denied 84 NY2d 810 [murder
in the second degree committed in an "egr~gious" and "gruesome" manner]).

Second, petitioner's possession of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, while not a
guarantee of parole release (see Matter ofWalker v Russi, 176 AD2d 1185, 1186, appeal dismissed
79 NY2d 897), creates a presumption in favor ofp~ole release (Correction Law §805). As relevant
here, Correction Law §805 states that petitioner "shall be granted release ... unless the Board of
Parole determines that there is reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, be will not live
I

an? remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is not compatible with the welfare

.

.

of society" @). In making this determination, the Board must consider, inter al.ia, "any available
information which would indicate an inability to live and remain at liberty without violating the law,
and that the release is incompatible with the welfare of society" (9 NYCRR §8002.3(c][5]).
Here, the Board's decision recites the.applicable statutory criteria for denying parole ~
release, but expressly relies on the serious nature of petitl~ner' s crime and his "violent response to
a confrontation in the community" as the exclusive rationale for its determination that he would be
unable to live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is incompatible with

.

.

the welfare of society. This determination was not reached in compliance with the requirements of
9 NYCRR §8002.3(c)(5), as the decision does not recite (and the record

do~s

not reveal) any

information providing indicia of pe_titioner's inability to live a law abiding life or that his release is
incompatible with the welfare ·o f s.oci~ty.' Cases cited by the respondent for the proposition th~t
petitioner's serious crime may be considered notwithstanding his possession of an EEC are not ~o
the contrary, as the records in those cases included significant factors supporting a denial of parole
5
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in addition to the serious nature ofthe instant offense (see Matter of Cornejo [petitioner was serving
three separate felony sentences, including one for attempted promoting prison contraband in the first
degree]; Matter ofHerouard, 250 AD2d, at 912 [parole denied "based upon [petitioner's] admitted
commission of serious crimes while he was on probation following a previous conviction together
with his failure to express remorse or acknowledge responsibility for his violent crimes, blaming his
~

criminal conduct on 'peer pressure'"]; Matte:r oqackson [decision based µpon "extremely violent"
nature of petitioner' s crime and his poor institutional disciplinary record]; Matter of Salcedo [Parole
I

B$ard decision recited the seriousness of petitioner's crime, his lack of insight into the danger to
which he exposed other persons, and his lack of remorse]).
Moreover, in light of the holding of Krng (supra), it is erroneous for respondent to
conclude that petitioner's commission of a serious · crime aggravating or egregious circumstances -·· indicates that

in the absence of significantly

he will not be law abiding in the future or

that his release is incompatible with the welfare of society. Indeed, in imposing an indeterminate
sentence within the r~ge authorized by the Legislature, the court that imposed petitioner's sentence
has already determined that, in the absence of negative factors flowing· from respondent's
consideration of the enumerated requirements set forth in 9 NYCRR §8002.3(c), release at the
expiration of petitioner's minimum term would not be incompatible with the welfare of society.
Petitioner's. remaining contentions warrant little discussion. Respondent correctly
.
contends that petitioner's claim ofcommissioner bia~ was waived, and that his contentions regarding
political or other non-statutory influences are not preserved for this Court's review. Petitioner's
allegation that respondent violated 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b) is without merit because that regulatory

6
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provision applies wh~n the minimum period of incarceration was set pursuant to the guidelines, and
not by the sentencing court. Finally, while the Board's decision must set forth the reasons for denial
in detail (see Executive Law §259-i[2][a] [i]), there is no requirement that the Board advise an inmate
of rehabilitative steps that may be taken to earn parole at a re-appearaµce before the Board, however
desirable or appropriate that might otherwise be in,, a model indeterminate sentencing structure.
In sum, resg ondent' s determination to deny parole was not reachedin accordance with
law,
and in the absence of record supJ?Ort, it was:rnot rationally based. Accordingly, it is hereby
I
ORDERED, that the petition is GRANTED, the determination denying parole is
annulled, and the matter is remanded to the Board of Parole-for a prompt re-hearing before a new
panel and a decision not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
This memorandum shall constitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court.
All papers, including this Decision, are being returned to respondent's attorney. The
signing of this Decision shall not constitute entry or filing. Counsel is not relieved from the
applicable provisions of the CPLR respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.
SO ORDERED.

ENTER JUDGMENT.
Dated: Albany, New York
March
2004
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Edward A ..Sheridan, AJ.S.C.
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PAPERS CONSIDERED:
(1) Order to Show Cause, signed September 2, 2003;
· (2) Verified Petition, dated August 12, 2003, with exhibits A-D;
(3) Verified Answer, dated November 3, 2003, with exhibits A-H;
(4) Affirmation of Megan M. Brown, Esq., dated November 4, 2003;
(5) Petitioner's Response, dated December 2, 2003.
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